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The federal sentencing guidelines just passed thirty.1 But 
they have not been aging well. Even though they were widely 
heralded at their inception, the problems became obvious early. 
Some were due to policy decisions made during the drafting 
process; others stemmed from the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s self-definition as the guardian of the guidelines; 
and others were created by Congress, with its penchant for 
mandatory minimums. 
Truth in sentencing, less judicial discretion, and fewer 
unwarranted disparities among defendants were among the 
guidelines’ animating principles. The drafters, however, 
eschewed a guiding punishment philosophy. Instead they 
promised greater reliance on empirical data, including ongoing 
review of the guidelines based on collected sentencing data. 
Over time, those reviews seemed to serve largely the goal of 
stamping out what the Commission deemed disparities, usually 
judge-driven departures from the otherwise prescribed grid.2  
Parallel to the Commission’s early work, Congress passed 
mandatory minimums, especially for drug and gun crimes. 
Later it added other offenses, including child pornography. The 
panoply of mandatory minimum sentencing affects much of the 
federal docket, limits judicial discretion, and continues to drive 
up the prison population.3 Frequently the inequities sentences 
produce are laid at the door of the guidelines. At least initially, 
the guidelines reinforced those inequities but did not create 
them. 
 
 1. The federal sentencing guidelines went into effect officially on 
November 1, 1987. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). Still the federal judiciary did not implement them 
fully until the Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality against a 
challenge under the Non-Delegation Clause in Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361 (1989). 
 2. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, THE FEAR OF JUDGING 
(1998). 
 3. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY 
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The Commission pegged guideline grids to such minimums, 
further lengthening all sentences that fell into these categories. 
In addition, Congress continued to generously fund the 
Department of Justice, allowing it to ramp up the number of 
prosecutions.4 The result: by 2012 the Bureau of Prisons ran the 
largest prison system in the country and the largest federal 
prison system ever.5 Since then the federal prison system has 
decreased in size, thanks to the Obama Clemency Initiative, 
congressional and Commission action on the crack-cocaine 
sentence differentials, and some other changes.  
The federal guidelines are one of about two-dozen 
sentencing guideline systems around the country.6 They are by 
far also the most disliked of all guidelines, with states defending 
their systems with the chant, “We are not the federal system.” 
Despite the success of the United States in exporting numerous 
features of its criminal justice system, sentencing guidelines are 
not among them. 
 For the guidelines, the most important change came years 
before the downturn in federal prisoners. In a landmark 
decision in 2006, the Supreme Court first declared the entire 
guideline regime unconstitutional before rescuing it by turning 
it from mandatory to non-binding.7 Despite greater judicial 
discretion, initially sentences changed little. Since then, more 
judges opt for shorter prison turns than suggested by the 
recommended grids.8 Differences in the rates by which judges 
use departures and so-called variances to sentence below the 
otherwise prescribed guideline grid vary dramatically around 
 
 4. Nora V. Demleitner, Revisiting the Role of Federal Prosecutors in 
Times of Mass Imprisonment, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 165, 166 (2018). 
 5. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ NO. 248955, 
PRISONERS IN 2014, at 2 tbl.1, 3 tbl.2 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub
/pdf/p14.pdf [perma.cc/T5DG-AF8R]. 
       6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:  PROFILES 
AND CONTINUUM (2008), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI
/State_Sentencing_Guidelines.ashx [https://perma.cc/6G7J-CHYT].  
 7. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 8. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, INTERACTIVE SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, SENTENCES RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE 
RANGE OVER TIME (6 Categories), https://isb.ussc.gov/api/repos/:USSC:figure
_xx.xcdf/generatedContent?&table_num=Figure_T6 [perma.cc/K7GC-84QZ]. 
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the country, leading the Commission to ring the warning bell 
about disparities and judicial discretion.9  
We have now lived with advisory guidelines almost as long 
as with their mandatory predecessor. After thirty years of 
federal guideline sentencing and almost half that time with 
advisory guidelines, the Journal’s fall symposium, Issues in 
Federal Sentencing: Privilege, Disparity, and a Way Forward, 
addressed some of the most challenging problems besetting 
federal sentencing. The commentators in this volume expand on 
some of these issues. While some questions may appear 
technical, broader concerns animate these discussions. The 
most important issue may be what role the federal criminal 
justice system, and especially federal sentencing, plays in 
society and what its function should be. At a time when national 
values, including the rule of law, have come under pressure and 
economic analysis appears to dominate consideration of any 
social problem, the issues our authors raise demand further 
analysis of values and rights. A sentencing system built on civil 
and human rights would not look like the one we currently have. 
The authors here, each in their own way, pave the way for a 
different, more equitable, and fairer future in sentencing. There 
could not be a place better than a Journal with a focus on civil 
rights and social justice for a discussion about these values and 
the path for their application in federal sentencing. 
The Introduction first focuses on the value of a symposium 
on federal sentencing as a teaching, research, and advocacy tool. 
The second section centers on questions of equality and 
equitable treatment in federal sentencing. It details how unfair 
sentencing has been to minority defendants and then highlights 
the broader ramifications of those injustices in reinforcing bias 
and racial stereotyping. The guidelines have both mitigated and 
reinforced racial disparities. Technology and empirical research 
may provide the tools to decrease race-based differentials and 
also to bring about shorter and more rehabilitation-focused 
sentencing. The third section underscores the need for 
compassion, mercy, Menschlichkeit, in sentencing. All of these 
 
 9. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.30 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files
/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019
/Table30.pdf [perma.cc/92BF-MU9Q]. 
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are values a good legal education needs to keep in mind lest law 
become merely an exercise in logic or ideology. 
I. Why a Symposium on Federal Sentencing? 
As part of higher education, legal education and law schools 
are regularly under attack. Much of the charge centers on the 
cost of higher education and insufficient focus on preparing 
students for the workplace.10 In light of that discussion, one may 
ask what a law review symposium that requires resources adds 
to the educational mission? 
In a time of criminal justice reform, federal sentencing 
remains a center of attention. A symposium underscores the 
importance of federal sentencing but also highlights the role 
lawyering plays in bringing about legal change. It raises ethical 
challenges about social inequality, racism, and the role of 
technical lawyering at the expense of fairness, justice, and 
compassion. 
For law students, conferences reinforce the importance of 
lawyering skills and opportunities for policy changes. The 
federal guidelines would not have become advisory had it not 
been for lawyers who argued then novel Sixth Amendment 
claims.11 They built a set of precedents leading to monumental 
change in federal guideline sentencing.12 Today the federal 
guidelines allow for more creative sentencing arguments than 
ever before. 
In his Article, Federal Sentencing: A Judge’s Personal 
Sentencing Journey Told Through Voices of Offenders He 
Sentenced, Judge Mark Bennett, a recently retired federal 
district judge in Iowa, laments the quality of much of the 
criminal representation he encountered as a sentencing judge. 
Despite some outstanding public defenders, he notes that many 
 
 10. For a thoughtful discussion of professional preparation, see WILLIAM 
M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW (2007), http://archive.carnegiefoundation.org/pdfs/elibrary/elibrary_pdf
_632.pdf [perma.cc/46VF-DPM7]. 
 11. See Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
 12. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
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defense lawyers fail to explore and brief mitigation arguments. 
Some judges may be willing to ask mitigation questions 
themselves. Many, however, will not, and valid arguments will 
never reach them. 
Judge Bennett encourages lawyers to make not only 
individual mitigation arguments but also pursue broader 
challenges to specific aspects of guideline sentencing, such as 
the crack-cocaine sentence differentials.13 He, for example, 
began to reject the 100:1 sentencing ratio between crack and 
powder cocaine baked into the guidelines before Congress 
legislatively changed it to 18:1.14 At the time, this was a creative 
and courageous decision, which was later sanctioned by the 
Supreme Court.15 The Supreme Court affirmed the power of 
district courts to adopt a different sentence regime than the 
guidelines indicated as long as the Commission’s decision was 
not based on a persuasive empirical approach.  
The current 18:1 ratio represents a political compromise 
rather than a victory of empiricism. As the ratio continues to be 
based on questionable data, some district court judges, 
including Judge Bennett, noted again a policy difference with 
the Commission and adopted lower ratios, including 1:1. The 
federal government never appealed Judge Bennett’s 1:1 ratio. 
In the meantime, federal appellate courts have expanded the 
purview of variances that allow judges to impose lower than 
otherwise prescribed sentences based on policy disagreements.16 
 
 13. Important policy disagreements about specific guidelines continue to 
exist. One example is an intra-district difference between judges in the 
Western District of Virginia over the methamphetamine guideline. Compare 
United States v. Moreno, No. 5:19CR002, 2019 WL 3557889 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 
2019), with United States v. Farris, 421 F. Supp. 3d 321 (W.D. Va. 2019), and 
United States v. Dennison II, No. 5:18CR00035 (W.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2019). 
 14. See Fair Sentencing Act, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://
www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/drug-law-reform/fair-sentencing-
act (last visited Apr. 24, 2020) [perma.cc/7P94-2CNQ]. 
 15. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007); Spears v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) (per curiam). The Spears decision arose from Judge 
Bennett’s case. 
 16. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEPARTURE 
AND VARIANCE PRIMER 49–52 (2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files
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These examples also highlight the need for good empirical 
data that supports legal arguments and policy changes. There 
are many open questions in federal sentencing that remain 
fodder for research. Among them are the length of federal 
supervision and the success of types of supervision. Federal 
judges almost automatically impose post-sentence supervision 
for a three- or five-year timeframe, depending on the offense 
type, turning permissive language in the guidelines into an 
apparently binding command.17 Defense lawyers fail to focus on 
that issue, as their attention remains on the term of 
imprisonment. Yet, post-sentence supervision presents a 
stressful and perhaps unnecessarily lengthy time for (technical) 
failure. There is immense need for research on this issue that 
can then be used for legal argument at sentencing. 
As the presentations and presenters brought their personal 
commitment to these issues, this symposium also highlighted 
that law is not just a logic game. Values matter and, in federal 
sentencing, compassion and consideration of what a sentence 
means to an individual, their family, and community impact the 
outcome. One of the perennial issues in criminal justice is 
unwarranted racial bias and how to address it at sentencing. 
II. Racial Bias in the Federal Criminal Justice System 
COVID-19 reveals stark inequalities within our society. 
Class, race, gender present powerful fault lines. That is also true 
for the criminal justice system. At every step, pre-existing 
inequalities become further magnified. Differences remain 
subject to disagreement over whether they are a function of 
prior inequalities, whether they are warranted or not. Better 
data may provide us with greater insight in individual cases. 
Yet, societally that may not suffice as a racially biased criminal 




 17. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO 
SUPERVISED RELEASE (2010), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf
/research-and-publications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised
_Release.pdf [perma.cc/5XUE-YTNV]. 
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A. Biases in the Criminal Justice System 
Race bias in the federal criminal justice system is not a 
function of the sentencing guidelines, but long precedes them. It 
goes back to the founding of the country and since then has been 
like a cancerous growth. Still as Professor Jelani Jefferson 
Exum discusses in her Article, Sentencing Disparities and the 
Dangerous Perpetuation of Racial Bias, not all Americans believe 
the criminal justice system is racially biased. Unsurprisingly, 
the divides run along racial lines, further reinforcing differences 
and stereotypes. 
1. Unwarranted Racial Disparity: Individual Injustice 
Matthew Rowland, in his Article, Technology’s Influence on 
Sentencing: Past, Present, and Future, recounts how 
rehabilitation—the dominant penal philosophy underlying the 
indeterminate sentencing regime that preceded the guidelines, 
and broad statutory sentence ranges provided the only limits on 
federal sentences. Different judges took vastly different 
approaches, which resulted in substantial disparities between 
sentences imposed around the country and sometimes even in 
the same courthouse. Yet, back then, the sentences the judges 
imposed were not final as they are today under the guidelines. 
The U.S. Parole Commission could release inmates after they 
had served at least one third of their sentences.18 That could 
lead to further disparities or correct judicial differentials. 
One impetus for passage of the federal sentencing 
guidelines was the obvious and disturbing racial inequality in 
the system. Individual judges might have been able to explain 
differences in the sentences they imposed between individual 
defendants. Yet, systemic data showed racial bias at every stage 
of the criminal justice system.19  
 
 18. The U.S. Parole Commission continues to have jurisdiction over 
federal inmates (and parolees) sentenced pre-guidelines. See Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/uspc/frequently-asked-
questions (last visited Apr. 27, 2020) [perma.cc/GS96-4M75].  
 19. See, e.g., Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the 
U.S. Criminal Justice System, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Apr. 19, 2018), https://
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The best-known example of racial disparity built directly 
into federal criminal legislation is the crack-cocaine sentencing 
differential.20 Even when Congress was presented with evidence 
that the large differential was empirically unfounded and led to 
unwarranted racial disparities, change came slowly, prodded by 
the federal judiciary and the Sentencing Commission. Congress 
ultimately lowered the statutory sentence differentials but did 
not erase them despite empirical data supporting such a 
decision.21 More African Americans continue to go to prison for 
longer periods of time because of that difference.22 
Racial disparity may result not only from legislation but 
also from enforcement. Not all congressional statutes are 
equally enforced. Some linger in obscurity. It is law enforcement 
officers and federal prosecutors who decide whether to 
investigate and commence a criminal action.23 Law enforcement 
activities in the federal system are often subject to priorities of 
the President’s Administration. For example, during the Trump 
Administration, immigration offenders have made up an ever 
larger percentage of federal inmates.24 
 
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/8SXK-5W8H]. 
 20. For the history and ramifications of crack–cocaine differentials, see 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  IMPACT OF THE FAIR 
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf
/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-topics/201507_RtC_Fair-
Sentencing-Act.pdf#page=8 [perma.cc/WYL9-MTD]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. For a discussion of the federal criminal code, see, e.g., Julie R. 
O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes 
as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2006). 
 24. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS fig.I-2 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/FigureI2.pdf 
[perma.cc/SF48-49AV]. Data on federal prosecutions indicate a substantial 
increase in immigration cases. See Immigration Prosecutions for February 
2020, TRAC IMMIGR. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins
/immigration/monthlyfeb20/fil/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2020) [perma.cc/K9LQ-
TU2J]. On the other hand, white collar prosecutions have declined 
precipitously compared to five years ago. See White Collar Crime Prosecutions 
for February 2020, TRAC IMMIGR. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://trac.syr.edu
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Between 1986 and 2018, the number of federal charges 
increased by over 75 percent. With almost 98 percent of federal 
cases ending with a guilty plea in fiscal year 2019,25 charging 
and bargaining policies set by the Department of Justice and in 
local U.S. Attorneys’ offices are often determinative. In the end, 
a prison term seems almost inevitable after a conviction. 
Because of some fateful policy decisions, since their inception, 
the guidelines have been almost entirely prison-focused. That 
means the vast majority of convicted federal defendants enter 
detention.26 Since the late 1980s, the average length of time a 
federal offender serves has doubled.27  
Sentencing is not only about judges but rather the 
sentencing outcome mirrors policies of all three branches of 
government.28 Still a judge imposes the actual sentence. Even 
after the sentence is imposed, the involvement of the three 
branches continues. Prosecutors weigh in on supervision 
violations and traditionally have a say on presidential clemency 
decisions. Judges supervise probation and post-prison 
supervision terms and may oversee occasional sentence 
modifications. Since most federal defendants are sent to prison, 
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) confines inmates and is responsible 
 
/tracreports/bulletins/white_collar_crime/monthlyfeb20/fil/ (last visited Apr. 
21, 2020) [perma.cc/RJ42-BWTN].   
 25. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl.11 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/Table11.pdf 
[perma.cc/3FEZ-E8JF]. 
 26. See id. fig.6, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/Figure06.pdf 
[perma.cc/RZ5B-REMH]. 
 27. Prison Time Surges for Federal Inmates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
(Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-
briefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates (last visited Apr. 21, 
2020) [perma.cc/79KL-RAYS]. 
 28. On the role of prosecutors, see, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Prosecutors 
and Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION 
(Kay Levine, Russell Gold & Ronald F. Wright eds., forthcoming 2020); 
Demleitner, supra note 4; Andrew D. Leipold, Criminal Dockets, Sentencing, 
and the Changing Role of Federal Prosecutors, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 177 (2018); 
Chiraag Bains, Looking in the Mirror: The Prosecutor’s Role in Ending Mass 
Incarceration, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 197 (2018). 
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for in-prison rehabilitation and training to the extent they are 
currently offered.29 At each of the stages of the criminal justice 
system, racially disparate results are obvious. To what extent 
they reinforce or counteract each other remains unresolved. 
On the positive side, empirical studies, not conclusive but 
persuasive, indicate that mandatory guidelines decreased 
unwarranted racial disparities. Sentencing commission studies 
indicate that with the onset of non-binding guidelines, 
unwarranted racial disparity has reared back. But many have 
challenged those findings.30  
Rowland discusses some of the studies that either show 
racial bias or refute it. With the data currently available, the 
debate will remain inconclusive. The challenge is in 
ascertaining when differences are unwarranted. After all, 
warranted differences are as significant to fairness as 
unwarranted differences undermine it. As important as the data 
discussion is for individual cases, the impact of racial bias in the 
criminal justice system and sentencing extend far beyond the 
confines of that system. After all these disparities, as Jefferson 
Exum notes, “perpetuat[e] the racial bias that increases the 
daily danger of living as a Black American.” The race-based 
disparity visible in federal sentencing supports societal biases 
that in turn undergird unwarranted racial differences in our 
criminal justice and sentencing systems. The regeneration of 
prejudice is circular with differential outcomes mutually 
reinforcing each other. 
2. Unwarranted Racial Disparities: Societal Impact 
As Jefferson Exum explains, our society’s race biases infect 
law enforcement, which in turn reinforces disparate 
enforcement against African Americans. Sentencing disparities 
 
 29. The First Step Act has substantially expanded the responsibility of 
the BOP in providing rehabilitation-focused services and training. See, e.g., 
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: 
AN OVERVIEW (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45558 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2020) [perma.cc/CLQ7-WC3Z]. 
 30. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing after Booker, 48 CRIME & 
JUST. 137 (2019). 
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are both informed by and contribute further to such biases, 
which are reflected in the stark racial disproportionality 
between imprisoned Whites and African Americans.31  
Originally slavery and its aftermath conditioned White 
Americans to believe that biological differences accounted for 
higher criminality of Black citizens. During the Progressive Era, 
they exchanged biology for culture as the reason why African 
Americans were allegedly more crime prone. Curiously, today 
the disparity in the criminal justice system may reinforce the 
impression that Blacks are more likely to be criminals. A tool 
designed to shame America into confronting racial bias in the 
criminal justice system is now a powerful reason, 
subconsciously, for perpetuating that regime. As the vast 
majority of White Americans believe in the fairness of the 
criminal justice system, as Jefferson Exum details, the 
disproportionate imprisonment of Blacks does not reveal 
prejudice but instead affirms their belief in the greater 
criminality of African Americans. 
We witness race-informed disparate treatment in all 
aspects of society, including education and employment. In fact, 
the well-intentioned “Ban the Box” movement may have fallen 
victim to racial stereotyping that emerges from criminal justice 
data. Ban the Box prevents employers from accessing 
applicants’ criminal record unless they have advanced 
substantially through the hiring regime, in some cases until 
receipt of an employment offer.32 The system has overall 
decreased bias against people with a criminal record—and at 
 
 31. Sentencing data for Fiscal Year 2019 indicates that approximately 
the same number of Black and White offenders were sentenced even though 
the population breakdown indicates sixty-four percent Whites and twelve 
percent African Americans in the United States. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.5 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov
/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2019/Table05.pdf [perma.cc/GSK8-V2JC]. Bureau of Prison data 
shows that in March 2020, approximately thirty-eight percent of inmates were 
Black. Statistics: Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Apr. 11, 2020), https://
www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp (last visited Apr. 21, 
2020) [perma.cc/3SF2-3GF6]. 
 32. See Ban the Box, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/campaigns/ban-the-
box/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/S46N-CQHD]. 
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the same time decreased employment opportunities for young 
African American men. Apparently, employers, aware of 
disparate criminal record data, discriminate against all Black 
applicants, presumably based on statistical crime data, rather 
than awaiting a later criminal record check.33 
These biases are so pervasive that de-biasing training 
cannot be applied across the board, Jefferson Exum concludes, 
but instead broader solutions as applied in other areas are 
necessary. Rowland suggests, more optimistically, that 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can provide the necessary data to 
reveal the racial bias present in the criminal justice system and 
help build processes to shield against it. Addressing racial 
disparity has to be an explicit goal of the sentencing process to 
assure individual fairness. Yet, the societal importance may 
extend far beyond individual fairness, as Jefferson Exum so 
persuasively argues. Sentence equality, as a function of racial 
equity throughout the system, is crucial to remove deeply 
misleading data that immeasurably harms African Americans 
by further reinforcing existing race bias. Jefferson Exum’s 
analysis propels racial equality from an important 
measurement to the most important dimension of success in 
sentencing because the stakes for society are the greatest.  
Even though the disparities in our criminal justice system 
manifest most obviously in findings of guilt and the imposition 
of criminal justice sentences, they are present throughout the 
system. Judicial attempts at routing out racial disparities at 
that point are clearly important but not sufficient. Besides 
sentencing, the judiciary can help build the jurisprudence that 
provides the tools to enforce greater racial equality. Judges, for 
example, could help restrain the discretion of prosecutors to 
achieve greater racial equality.34 Yet, the impetus for such a 
novel approach to rethink federal sentencing appears missing. 
 
 33. See, e.g., CHRISTINA PLERHOPLES STACY & MYCHAL COHEN, THE URBAN 
INST., BAN THE BOX AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2017), https://www.urban.org
/sites/default/files/publication/88366/ban_the_box_and_racial_discrimination
_4.pdf [perma.cc/W9G4-9C3G]. 
 34. Recent developments in Virginia, however, may point the other way. 
As progressive prosecutors have attempted to dismiss and not prosecute minor 
marijuana offenses prior to decriminalization, courts have demanded greater 
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Racial segregation came to be acknowledged as a national 
disgrace by the 1950s, but it also presented an international 
problem for the United States. The Cold War was not only a 
struggle over weapons systems but also about values and 
ideologies. For the USSR, segregation served as a tool to 
demonstrate how miserably the United States failed the values 
of human rights and equality it espoused abroad. The Supreme 
Court understood that challenge. Its famous desegregation 
decisions were a powerful response to the most visible domestic 
human rights failure.35  
Today the situation appears reversed. As the United States 
indicates less interest in the protection of human rights around 
the globe and gazes largely inward, concerns about U.S. prestige 
abroad will likely decline, removing an important impetus for 
internal reform. Broad change, therefore, has to come from 
other sources. Technology may present us with the tool to ferret 
out and support charges of unequal treatment based on race and 
then shame the country into change.  
B. Can Technology Save Us? 
Technology has changed our lives throughout history, 
though the still recent developments of the Internet, social 
media, and big data portend ever more and faster change. These 
changes have also impacted the criminal justice system. Court 
filings are accepted electronically, and hearings are possible via 
video hookup. Female federal inmates are allowed video visits; 
judges have issued sentences limiting Internet access; police use 
hotspot data to inform policing; states have adopted risk 
assessments to make bail and diversion decisions. An early user 
of data was the federal sentencing commission, which has 
 
oversight. That development runs counter to the general lack of judicial 
interference in charging decisions and is disturbing in light of the 
well-documented racial disparities in low-level marijuana prosecutions. See 
Nora V. Demleitner, State Prosecutors at the Center of Mass Imprisonment and 
Criminal Justice Reform, 32 FED. SENT’G REP. 187 (2020); Peter Vieth, 
Arlington Judges Resist Prosecution Policies, VA. L. WKLY. (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://valawyersweekly.com/2020/04/13/arlington-judges-resist-prosecution-
policies/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2020) [perma.cc/4KR4-MUBR]. 
 35. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011). 
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collected and analyzed sentence data since it drafted the first 
set of guidelines. 
Matthew Rowland, the former head of the probation and 
pretrial services office at the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, writes that technological change has been instrumental 
in changing sentencing. With sentencing theory and the 
philosophy of punishment largely unchanged for decades, the 
Sentencing Commission’s data collection and research informed 
the new regime. Still, we seem to be only at the start of 
understanding crucial elements of sentencing, such as the 
impact of different types of treatment on recidivism. Rowland 
deems AI a game-changer, a way to dramatically improve, not 
displace, human decision-making in sentencing. It would inform 
programming changes for an offender, for example, aimed at 
enhancing public safety. 
Much of the current focus in the criminal justice system 
centers on high rates of recidivism. Despite much discussion 
around the term, its definition varies substantially, as Rowland 
indicates. Some studies differ in the length of the timeframe 
used to assess re-offending; others focus on arrest, not 
conviction data; some look at re-arrests for felonies but not 
misdemeanors or technical supervision violations; others may 
consider only convictions of the same or a higher severity-level 
offense.36 Because of these reasons, comparable data—
nationally and internationally—is hard to come by.  
Some use recidivism studies indicating high re-offense rates 
to show that only incapacitation “works.” Rowland, however, 
notes how little we know about what may dissuade an offender 
from re-offending. Traditionally recidivism studies focused on 
easily measurable factors, such as criminal record, age, or type 
of offense. More recent studies increasingly incorporate 
attitudinal and cognitive factors. Artificial intelligence, with its 
ability to aggregate vast amounts of data could, for example, 
lead to more accurate evidence and better predictions on what 
 
 36. For some discussion of the different measures possible, see Measuring 
Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Feb. 20, 2008), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles
/measuring-recidivism (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/4GRZ-KSEF]; 
THE URBAN INST., MEASURING RECIDIVISM AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:  A QUICK GUIDE, 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/recidivism-measures_final-for-
website.pdf [perma.cc/8FU7-43Z5]. 
Demleitner_Introduction.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2020  3:51 PM 
xxvi 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. xi (2020) 
 
combination of programs lower the risk depending on the type 
of offender. AI promises not only more data but also the 
possibility of greater accuracy, more transparency, and faster 
results in determining how to protect public safety while 
maximizing an individual’s potential. 
Even though Rowland acknowledges concerns about AI 
reinforcing racial biases, he does not deem those 
insurmountable. Most important to him is the opportunity for 
AI to provide substantially better risk prediction tools allowing 
for sentences that could more effectively target an individual’s 
criminogenic factors.  
AI tools hold unprecedented possibilities as they use 
detailed information about an offender to change otherwise 
predicted outcomes. Yet, they still require important societal 
consensus on public safety as the leading goal for sentencing 
and on investing in those who ran afoul of the criminal justice 
system. Neither is currently the case as a modified just deserts 
model governs federal sentencing.37 A further concern lurks in 
the background—if criminogenic factors can be modified, why 
would a public safety focus not emphasize pre-offense 
prevention? Such an approach would threaten civil liberties as 
it could entail population-wide assessments of criminogenic 
factors and broad-based services and programming to change 
them. 
Even without apocalyptic concerns, AI may not remedy but 
instead reinforce some inequalities. Rowland’s commitment to 
the mitigation of criminogenic risk factors and his belief that 
such services can be delivered outside of prison undergird his 
faith in AI. Yet even if AI provided all the benefits he outlines, 
federal judges would not be bound to follow AI-based 
recommendations. In some cases, even those who accept the 
value of such evidence-based sentencing may still resort to a 
prison sentence precisely so that the offender has any hope to 
receive necessary services. Defendants from rural areas or from 
parts of the country that are more impoverished or less invested 
 
 37. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the 
Rules:  Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003); Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing 
the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557 (2003). 
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in social services may not have the same options and 
opportunities to receive appropriate services than those from 
more urban areas. Socio-economic differences may also become 
more pronounced. If AI-based sentencing is to cut down on 
prison numbers, the success may be more mixed than desired. 
That would be of substantial concern to Judge Bennett, who 
suggests slashing guidelines by as much as fifty percent to 
restore time served and overall sentence lengths closer to 
pre-guideline sentencing. Despite our focus on imprisonment, on 
the state level the most frequent sentences are fines and 
probation. In the federal system, however, imprisonment is the 
default. Judge Bennett credits the sentencing commission’s 
initial decision not to consider probation sentences when setting 
up the grid. He wants to see a return to more community-based 
sentencing. 
Certainly, public safety does not require the sentence 
lengths we currently espouse. Even current evidence-based 
practices could help set lower sentence lengths and lead to more 
effective supervision. Federal probation services, under 
Rowland’s leadership, proved that possible after the early 
release of thousands sentenced under previously higher crack 
cocaine guidelines and mandatory minimums.38 
Broad sentence decreases require risk tolerance. Yet, the 
infamous Willie Horton TV ad that ended both Governor 
Dukakis’s presidential ambitions39 and the generally highly 
successful Massachusetts furlough program40 implied a no-error 
release policy. Since then, we have operated on the assumption 
that it is better to incarcerate a person for far longer than public 
safety predictions support than to accept a reasonable risk 
inherent in virtually any release. 
 
 38. See Matthew G. Rowland, Projecting Recidivism Rates for Federal 
Drug Offenders Released Early from Prison, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 259 (2016). 
 39. See Peter Baker, Bush Made Willie Horton an Issue in 1988, and the 
Racial Scars Are Still Fresh, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/03/us/politics/bush-willie-horton.html?auth=login-
email&login=email (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/WGQ6-7CHW]. 
 40. See Robin Toner, Prison Furloughs in Massachusetts Threaten 
Dukakis Record on Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com
/1988/07/05/us/prison-furloughs-in-massachusetts-threaten-dukakis-record-
on-crime.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/RS5D-B2J6]. 
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Evidence-based practices, AI, and the reduction of 
criminogenic factors do not alter procedural rules and the 
overall construction of the federal system. Federal judges lack 
the ability to bind BOP to assign a defendant to a particular 
prison or allow enrollment in programming. Without BOP’s 
willingness to follow judicial guidance when based on AI 
information, sentences may turn out to be wrongly calibrated. 
Alternatively, BOP could use its own predictive instruments, 
which may lead to a conflict with judicial recommendations. The 
different branches of government would have to cooperate in 
unprecedented ways to effectively implement such public safety 
efforts. 
As new insights are reached about best ways to achieve 
public safety through offender programming, judges would need 
the ability to undo past sentences. That option currently exists 
only under the most limited circumstances. In one of his 
offender vignettes, Judge Bennett admits that even his 
below-guideline sentence for a defendant now strikes him as too 
high and as incorrectly allocating prison and supervision time. 
Yet, there is nothing he can do. His hands are tied, as are those 
of almost all other actors in the criminal justice system.  
As treatment programs impact individuals at different 
stages, more opportunities to re-assess sentences might also be 
advisable. Pre-guideline parole, for example, mandated such 
sentence review, but left it in the hands of the executive branch. 
Judges could be granted the tools to revisit ongoing sentences. 
Those exist now only for certain offenders convicted of crack 
cocaine offenses. The decision whether to release early is heavily 
based on public safety considerations. 41 A more expanded 
version of such releases may be the “second-look” provisions 
included in the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code: 
 
 41. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 
RESENTENCING PROVISIONS RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT (2020), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-
analyses/first-step-act/20200203-First-Step-Act-Retro.pdf [perma.cc/7ERT-
2KG3]; Carly Hudson, Between a Rock and a Hard Place:  Ensuring that 
Defendants Incorrectly Sentenced Between the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and 
United States v. Dorsey Achieve Re-Sentencing, 48 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 
141 (2014). 
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Sentencing.42 They would provide the judiciary with the ability 
to review sentences at stated times during the execution of the 
sentence. 
The guidelines, however, were not designed to focus 
primarily on public safety or rehabilitation. They are a modified 
just deserts model with largely one tool, incarceration. As 
federal judges have bemoaned mandatory minimums and 
guidelines that for long mandated they impose specific and often 
long sentences, some have argued for more compassion and 
humanity in the system.43 
III. Compassion and Menschlichkeit 
In the time of COVID-19, prison conditions have become a 
public talking point.44 While some state officials have been 
proactively decreasing jail admission rates and moving toward 
early releases, the federal system came late to that realization. 
Some federal prisons may be more conducive to social 
distancing, but generally these types of confined spaces serve as 
breeding grounds for contagious diseases, and especially the 
easily transmitted coronavirus.  
Traditionally state and federal inmates differed 
substantially. Yet, as the number of drug and violent offenders 
in the federal prison population has increased, that group 
increasingly resembles state prisoners who lack education, 
marketable skills, and suffer disproportionately from health 
 
 42. MODEL PENAL CODE:  SENTENCING (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft 
2017).  
 43. See, e.g., Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case of 
Judgment, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics
/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-for-judgment/463380/ (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2020) [perma.cc/9UH6-9EWW]; Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal 
Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2003), https://
www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/nyregion/new-york-s-federal-judges-protest-
sentencing-procedures.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2003) [perma.cc/U9PA-
5SE4]. 
 44. See Prisons Worldwide Risk Becoming Incubators of Covid-19, 
ECONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04
/20/prisons-worldwide-risk-becoming-incubators-of-covid-19 (last visited Apr. 
25, 2020) [perma.cc/LB4H-Y8Q5]. 
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challenges and addiction.45 In state and federal prisons, inmates 
are greying. Long sentences have increased the median age of 
federal inmates.46 Recidivism rates fall substantially with age, 
and failing health also translates into a crime-free life.  
At a minimum, the Bureau of Prisons should have 
immediately released older offenders, those with health 
challenges, and those close to release. Yet the Department of 
Justice hesitated, with both the Attorney General and U.S. 
attorneys around the country predicting a crime wave if those 
convicted were released early or sent to home confinement. 
Since the bipartisan passage of the First Step Act, no 
systemic change has occurred in the federal system. The era of 
mass imprisonment, including its mandatory minimum 
sentences, binding guidelines, and tough-on-crime rhetoric and 
mindset are difficult to surmount, even during an urgent crisis 
that may cost thousands of men and women in federal custody 
their lives. Lacking throughout the system is empathy, 
understanding others, compassion, and humility.  
A. Sentencing Is Hard 
Federal judges find sentencing to be the hardest aspect of 
their work.47 It means to condemn another human being, to face 
them and their family, to be fair and just and doing right by the 
victim. With the inception of the federal guidelines, sentencing 
has morphed from a “lawless” regime into a heavily regulated 
system that requires judges to be guideline specialists, staying 
current on the array of federal sentencing decisions issued from 
 
 45. In his Article, Judge Bennett describes the majority of drug 
defendants who came before him as “[n]on-violent, low-level, long-term and 
severe drug addicts.” 
 46. See, e.g., Lauren C. Porter et al., How the U.S. Prison Boom Has 
Changed the Age Distribution of the Prison Population, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 30 
(2016). 
 47. In his Article, Bennett states:  “I found the collective weight of so 
many sentencings more emotionally draining and soul robbing than the deaths 
of my son, all my siblings, and my parents.” See also Stephen R. Bough, Getting 
to Know a Felon: One Judge’s Attempt at Imposing Sentences that Are 
Sufficient, but Not Greater than Necessary, 87 UMKC L. REV. 25 (2018). 
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appellate courts and the Supreme Court.48 The Commission and 
the Federal Judicial Center offer regular training on sentencing 
developments. 
As many federal judges served as federal prosecutors, they 
bring with them a strong grounding in sentencing mechanics. 
Judge Bennett’s background prior to ascending to the federal 
bench was unusual. He had worked as a private criminal 
defense attorney and litigated civil rights cases, including police 
brutality cases. The appointments to the federal bench over the 
last three years make him look ever more like a unicorn. 
Before the guidelines became advisory, many federal judges 
complained about their mandatory nature and the harshness of 
federal sentences they had to impose. Even though the 
guidelines now allow for more judicial discretion, perhaps 
surprisingly many judges do not veer far off their path. Plea 
bargaining agreements and mandatory sentences continue to 
limit their discretion. The guideline calculation provides a 
starting point from which it may be difficult to diverge, 
especially when the prosecution reinforces the accuracy of the 
guideline range. That means federal sentences have not 
suddenly trended substantially lower.49  
A number of federal judges have lamented that they do not 
know what happens to people after they sentence them. Some 
have started reentry courts to facilitate the return of those they 
sent to prison.50 Others try to understand what the sentences 
they impose mean. Judge Bennett discusses his experience 
visiting with over four hundred of the men and women he 
sentenced over his almost twenty-five years on the bench. Those 
are about ten percent of all the people who came before him for 
sentencing. 
As a country, COVID-19 has taught us the importance of 
closeness, of human contact, and perhaps of human touch. For 
 
 48. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2. The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission annually provides a summary of the Supreme Court cases 
impacting federal sentencing. 
 49. See Hofer, supra note 30. 
 50. See, e.g., M. Casey Rodgers, Evidence-Based Supervision in the 
Northern District of Florida: Risk Assessment, Behavior Modification, and 
Prosocial Support—Promising Ingredients for Lowering Recidivism of Federal 
Offenders, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 239 (2016).  
Demleitner_Introduction.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2020  3:51 PM 
xxxii 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. xi (2020) 
 
many federal prisoners, human contact with the outside world 
is extremely limited. Judge Bennett notes that between eight 
and ten percent of the inmates he visited never had another 
visitor. Perhaps those prisoners have no family and friends—a 
function of their criminal conduct or of their lack of support and 
social integration prior to offending. The latter will make it 
harder for them to reintegrate, as family support counts as a 
powerful element in successful reentry. Alternatively, some 
inmates refuse visitors, perhaps because they do not want 
family members to see them imprisoned, or their families do not 
have the financial resources to visit them in faraway prisons. In 
the end, prisons are a world of their own, and even the so-called 
Camp Fed, the Bureau’s minimum-security prisons, present 
challenging experiences. Imprisonment of any length is a 
substantial sentence. In contrast to the German system, for 
example, in which deprivation of liberty is the purpose of 
imprisonment and all conditions have to approximate the 
outside world, federal prisons often appear designed to add 
additional deprivations beyond the loss of freedom. Before 
sentencing an offender to prison, Judge Bennett counsels his 
colleagues they need to understand what that means. 
While the contributors to this Issue explicitly or implicitly 
argue for less incarceration and shorter sentences, that call may 
apply particularly to the youngest federal offenders, a group 
rarely discussed. 
B. The Forgotten: Teenage Federal Offenders 
Research and scholarship on the federal guidelines 
abounds. Yet, some areas of federal sentencing remain shrouded 
in secrecy and are insufficiently researched and understood.  
In their Article, Professor Mae Quinn and her student 
Grace McLaughlin discuss a largely forgotten group of 
individuals in the federal system, defendants under the age of 
eighteen. Even the extent of their number is in dispute though 
it is not as negligible as generally assumed. 
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During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the image of the 
juvenile “super predator” governed the public’s imagination.51 
States at the time changed their laws so that ever younger 
teenagers, and in some states preteens, could be transferred 
from the rehabilitation-oriented juvenile delinquency system 
into the adult criminal justice system for trial. Since the federal 
system does not have separate juvenile courts, the issue never 
arose. Still, for a time, it seemed that the federal criminal justice 
system might take special aim at juveniles. With youth violence 
considered a major threat to public safety, the federal 
government turned some of its resources to fighting it, which led 
to more trials of juveniles in federal court. 
In the last few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has fielded 
a set of Eighth Amendment cases that arose in the states and 
challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty and of 
life-without-parole sanctions imposed on those who committed 
these offenses when they were under eighteen. The Court 
declared unconstitutional the juvenile death penalty, juvenile 
life-without parole for a non-homicide offense, and mandatory 
juvenile life-without-parole for homicides.52 In all of these cases, 
the Supreme Court found determinative substantial differences 
between the adult and the juvenile brain. The latter continues 
to develop, often leaving risk control and other adult brain 
functions underdeveloped. That implies both greater 
amenability to change and rehabilitation and lesser culpability. 
Still these insights do not appear to inform federal 
sentencing of those who committed offenses while under 
eighteen. Quinn and McLaughlin even indicate that some 
federal prosecutors seem to employ the transfer of juveniles into 
federal court as an important tool in fighting crime and a 
continuation of the war on drugs. That approach, however, may 
thwart counter-developments in the states that have restricted 
the age of transfer and have begun to recognize that juveniles 
 
 51. See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ 
Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us
/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/5C57-VQTV]. 
 52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
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are different. In light of research that indicates that brain 
development continues well past the age of eighteen into the 
mid-twenties, some jurisdictions are experimenting with 
different ways in how to address offenders between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-one.53 Perhaps it is time to reconsider all 
sentencing for those whose brain is still developing? After all, 
another indication of brain development and impulse control 
fully maturing by the mid-twenties is the declining recidivism 
rate from that age on. Still that impetus is unlikely to emerge 
from federal sentencing. 
Indeed, federal law enforcement efforts may be targeted at 
specific groups of young offenders, including non-citizens, 
Native Americans, and those labeled gang members. For 
non-citizen youths, federal convictions often lead directly to 
deportation. Stereotypes of immigrant groups may help federal 
prosecutors persuade judges that these children deserve to be 
tried and sentenced as adults.  
Perhaps up to half of the youths charged in federal court 
hail from Native American territory, Quinn and McLaughlin 
indicate. That is a function of special federal criminal 
jurisdiction over reservations. Largely Native Americans 
remain a forgotten part of federal sentencing,54 and Native 
American youths are even less visible.  
Gang-affiliated youth are of particular interest to federal 
law enforcement. Courts frequently equate gang affiliation with 
incorrigibility. To add to that perception, many of these young 
people are underage and many are non-U.S. citizens. The 
intersections of age with other characteristics that often lead to 
 
 53. See, e.g., John Kelly, In Another Big Year for “Raise the Age” Laws, 
One State Now Considers All Teens as Juveniles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (June 
25, 2018), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-
justice-raise-the-age-vermont-missouri-state-legislation/31430 (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2020) [perma.cc/CM75-Y4ET]. 
 54. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS—NATIVE AMERICAN 
OFFENDERS 1 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/quick-facts/Native_American_Offenders_FY19.pdf (stating 
that Native Americans were about two percent of federal offenders in fiscal 
year 2019) [perma.cc/8DWJ-PWP8]. 
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harsher sentences may present a new frontier both for federal 
defenders and children’s rights’ advocates. 
The number of non-citizens in the federal prison population 
has increased disproportionately to both their representation in 
the population and their involvement in crime. Persuasive 
studies indicate that immigrants, both documented and 
undocumented, are less crime-involved than native-born 
citizens.55 The reason for the increase of Hispanic offenders in 
particular is a function of the Trump Administration’s change 
in enforcement priorities. Rather than releasing illegal border 
crossers back to Mexico or charging them with a civil violation, 
they are now being charged criminally, mass processed, and 
sentenced to short prison terms for crossing the border 
illegally.56 
The Issues in Federal Sentencing: Privilege, Disparity, and a 
Way Forward Symposium and the articles printed in this Issue 
can provide only a glimpse into federal sentencing. Many areas 
demand further research. Judge Bennett, for example, 
concludes with his heartfelt gratitude to federal probation 
officers. They play a crucial role in the federal system, in part 
as adjuncts to judges. They compile the pre-sentence report, 
calculate the guideline range, and outline mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances. In addition, they supervise 
offenders and bring supervision failings before the judge. Their 
background and philosophy, therefore, play a crucial role in a 
system that is otherwise run by lawyers. Still, legal scholarship 
focuses little on them despite their authority and the important 
role they play in the sentencing system.  
 
 55. See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, Two Charts Demolish the Notion 
that Immigrants Here Illegally Commit More Crime, WASH. POST (June 19, 
2018, 2:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/19
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IV. Conclusion 
The crux of the problem with federal sentencing is not that 
it is failing us but rather that we are unable to grasp fully how 
it is failing us. Ultimately, we do not know what it would mean 
to have a successful sentencing system. If we prioritized human 
and civil rights values, equality, safety, and justice, we could 
build a more equitable and less punitive system.  
